Seminars

  • Founded
    2007
  • Seminar Number
    721

The Comparative Philosophy Seminar seeks to advance constructive philosophical projects by bringing together scholars with training in diverse areas of Asian (mostly Buddhist) thought and Western Philosophy. Comparison in this context is not employed to loan authority to one set of obscure discoveries by revealing its resonances with the works of others, deemed less obscure. Nor does it sociologize philosophy in search of general laws of human cultural and intellectual development. Rather, the intent is to explicate, and employ, the fullness of an expanded philosophical toolset—and see how that works. The seminar ordinarily invites respondents who are versed in the relevant field of philosophical inquiry, but who are not necessarily specialists in Asian thought. In order to facilitate an ongoing conversation, seminar meetings for a given year are loosely organized around a very general theme, which speakers are asked to address when possible. In past years, the themes have been “Personal Identity” (2007–2008) and “Meta-Ethics” (2008–2009).


Co-Chairs
Allison Aitken
allison.aitken@columbia.edu

Jonathan C. Gold
jcgold@princeton.edu

Hagop Sarkissian
hagop.sarkissian@baruch.cuny.edu

Rapporteur
Cole Fishman
cf2798@columbia.edu

Meeting Schedule

09/15/2023 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
War and Shame –A Debate on the Appropriate Response to Insults between the Confucians and their Interlocutors
Jing Hu, Concordia University, Canada
Speaker Link Abstract

Abstract

What is an appropriate response to humiliating treatments such as insults? This question is not only relevant to today’s discourse but has also piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. The Warring States period debate regarding whether one’s inner sense of shame can shield one from insulting situations and from experiencing shame is frequently presented as a one-sided narrative that focuses on the Confucian texts. Meanwhile, the views of their rival thinkers, such as the Daoist, legalist, or much-neglected Songzi (3rd century BCE), are rarely the focus of attention. This paper brings Songzi, a key player in the debate of emotions as responses to external triggers, into the picture and restores the historical intellectual discourse over the topic of what constitutes an appropriate response to humiliating situations such as insults. More importantly, I point out the philosophical significance of this debate, namely how Songzi prompts Xunzi to respond to an ambiguity within the Confucian doctrine: The early Confucians appear to think that an individual’s internal virtues can isolate and shield one from hostile external stimuli while also maintaining that the external environment impacts one’s moral cultivation and moral life in significant ways. Xunzi’s strategic move, I argue, is to give credit to both an inner sense of shame and the function of external stimuli in inducing negative emotions, thus making an important philosophical concession compared to Confucius and Mencius.


Respondent: Nalei Chen, New York University



10/13/2023 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:30 PM
Buddhist Analyses of the Unconscious Construction of our Collective ‘Life-Worlds’
William Waldron , Middlebury College
Speaker Link Abstract

Abstract

Yogācāra Buddhists articulated in the 3-5th c. CE India an explicit model of how we collectively, yet mostly unconsciously, construct our shared social realities, our cultures. These “worlds” are supported by cognitive processes informed by cultural influences occurring outside our conscious awareness, in the “store-house consciousness” (ālaya-vijñāna). Through development and socialization, we come to identify with these cultural norms, thinking “I am this” and “this is mine.” Moreover, and in agreement with cognitive scientists, Yogācārins argue that humans have developed to be “innate essentialists,” so that we imagine that our constructed social and cultural identities have their own essential, intrinsic characteristics, set apart from all others, generating the “us/them” dichotomies that underlie conflicts between groups. We can counteract these harmful patterns, Yogācārins say, by analyzing how our social and cultural “realities” are collectively constructed, and by showing how—through logical, psychological, and contemplative exercises—we may weaken our unreflective, knee-jerk reaction to different peoples and cultures, and thereby foster more tolerance, empathy and understanding for all beings. In sum, Yogācāra Buddhism offers a rigorous and nuanced analysis of the origins of our prejudices and a set of methods to overcome them, rooted in ancient traditions yet relevant to contemporary issues.


Respondent: Jonathan Gold, Princeton University



10/27/2023 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
Zhuangzi on Not Following the Leader
David Wong, Duke University
Speaker Link Abstract

Abstract

I begin with identifying Confucian metaphors of leadership for the way the mind (or the heart-mind) should lead the whole person. I then discuss how the Daoist text Zhuangzi criticizes this conception of the mind’s leadership as too fixed and rigid--unresponsive to the fluidity and unpredictability of the world. The text suggests as an alternative a way that the whole embodied person can fluidly respond to the world. This alternative ties into some contemporary work, scientific and philosophical, of how the whole person and not just the deliberating mind processes information from the world. I end by discussing how the critique of the fixed and rigid mind can suggest alternative models of political governance that distribute and integrate guidance throughout the body politic.


Respondent: Christopher Gowans, Fordham University



12/01/2023 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
Mind the Gap: Methodological Pluralism in Comparative Philosophy
Stephen Angle, Wesleyan University
Speaker Link Abstract

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Despite the political polarization that characterizes many of our societies and much of the world, comparative philosophy — which depends on crossing various kinds of boundaries — is intellectually and professionally doing reasonably well. Exciting new work continues to appear and venues for publication and discussion (print and digital, in person and on-line) are proliferating. Another thing that is proliferating, though, is names for what it is we are doing. Are comparative, cross-cultural, intercultural, blended, and fusion philosophy all the same thing? What do they share and where do they diverge, and why? Can we identify a distinctive project of comparative philosophy and say why it is important? Based on a broad survey of approaches, in this essay I offer answers to these questions. I maintain that whenever we do philosophy by drawing on at least two significantly different traditions of philosophy, we are doing comparative philosophy. Unpacking some of the key words in this definition will enable me to clarify some persistent confusions as well as to stress the constitutive gamble that lies at the heart of all comparative philosophy. I identify three different ways to do comparative philosophy well—Comparison Philosophy, Rooted Global Philosophy, and Emergent Intercultural Philosophy—and argue that which method to choose depends both on the values that motivate one’s inquiry and on the pragmatic situation that frames one’s work.


Respondent: Katja Vogt , Columbia University



01/19/2024 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:30 PM
Nyāya, Buddhism, Rāmakaṇṭha, and Galen Strawson on the Existence of Selves
Alex Watson, Ashoka University
Abstract

Abstract

The first section of the talk will give an account of the Hindu-Buddhist debate about the existence of selves. The particular Hindu / Brāhmaṇical tradition concentrated on is Nyāya, and ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer specifically to Dharmakīrtian Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness. The second section looks at a Nyāya argument against Buddhism. I will argue that it is not difficult for the Buddhist to come up with a satisfactory response. The third section will introduce the view of Rāmakaṇṭha (950–1000 CE) and look at three of his arguments against the Buddhist view. These I view as more difficult for the Buddhist to respond to. The fourth section introduces the view of Galen Strawson, relates it to the Buddhist view, and considers the extent to which it is susceptible to Rāmakaṇṭha's arguments.


Respondent: Martin Lin, Rutgers University



02/02/2024 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
TBD
Davey Tomlinson, Villanova University




04/05/2024 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
TBD
Laura Specker, Fordham University




05/03/2024 716 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University
5:00 PM
TBD
Daniel Stephens, University at Buffalo