It’s easy to say that the savagery and surprises of King Lear defy the norms of tragedy but harder to pinpoint the formal and generic maneuvers by which Shakespeare upends this ancient literary kind. Toward the harder end, and with the help of disability theory, I argue that King Lear revolves around a collision of (at least) two sorts of pity. The first harkens back to Aristotle’s proper outcrop of tragedy: pain felt for another, who suffers something one can imagine suffering oneself; this something is frequently located within the body. The second presages an affect more familiar to us now: plaintive condescension to another’s ill-fortune, which one does not, in fact, imagine enduring firsthand. Such pity often radiates from ablebodied subjects to disabled others, sometimes under the guise of care but really in the name of cure—and elimination.
Audaciously, Shakespeare dramatizes how the first of these easily suppurates into the second—and in any case, how elusive it is from the jump. For his part, an aged Lear tries to manufacture Aristotelian pity, ominously, at the start of the play; Goneril and Regan, for theirs, respond with the other pity to justify a sort of wardship. Division only deepens from there, as characters more desperately—but aggressively and fecklessly—chase their affective goals. In the process, they reveal a corporeal imagination tragically incommensurate to the embodied realities of life—most of all when glossing disability in others with rhetoric that will eventually redound upon them.
In Lear, Shakespeare brings this cycle—a career-long experiment—to its most horrifying proportions. Tracing them offers several interpretive pay-offs. It clarifies the stuff of Shakespeare’s iconoclastic tragic vision: that is, how he rejuvenates tragedy by thwarting the pity that the genre should effect. It also foregrounds an unacknowledged ethical insight of Lear, which both suggests that disabled folks actually need an affect we’ve long despised and reveals, by negative example, how we might ethically achieve it. The affect, of course, is pity, though a kind more complicated than any we’ve observed: a helpful third term in the sympathy/empathy binary, not based in power differentials, but in uncoerced, mutual, recognition of bodymind fragility—before it’s warped to solipsistic ends.