Seminars

  • Founded
    2007
  • Seminar Number
    721

The Comparative Philosophy Seminar seeks to advance constructive philosophical projects by bringing together scholars with training in diverse areas of Asian (mostly Buddhist) thought and Western Philosophy. Comparison in this context is not employed to loan authority to one set of obscure discoveries by revealing its resonances with the works of others, deemed less obscure. Nor does it sociologize philosophy in search of general laws of human cultural and intellectual development. Rather, the intent is to explicate, and employ, the fullness of an expanded philosophical toolset—and see how that works. The seminar ordinarily invites respondents who are versed in the relevant field of philosophical inquiry, but who are not necessarily specialists in Asian thought. In order to facilitate an ongoing conversation, seminar meetings for a given year are loosely organized around a very general theme, which speakers are asked to address when possible. In past years, the themes have been “Personal Identity” (2007–2008) and “Meta-Ethics” (2008–2009).


Co-Chairs
Professor Allison Aitken
allison.aitken@columbia.edu

Professor Jonathan C. Gold
jcgold@princeton.edu

Professor Hagop Sarkissian
hagop.sarkissian@baruch.cuny.edu

Rapporteur
Lucilla Ines Martorana
lm3335@columbia.edu

Meeting Schedule

10/22/2021 Online Meeting
7:00 PM
A Discussion of Fa (法) in the Shenzi
Eirik Lang Harris, Colorado State University
Speaker Link Abstract

Abstract

The Shenzi Fragments, numbering a mere 3,000 or so characters in length, is all that remains of a work attributed to Shen Dao (ca. 350-275 BCE). While perhaps best known for his appearance in the Han Feizi as an advocate for positional power (勢 shi), he also makes an appearance in the Xunzi as one who is blinded by his focus on 法 fa (models, standards, laws). We will examine the fragments that discuss fa in an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of the role that these fragments see for the fa, how they are to be determined, and why Shen Dao took them to be central to a strong, stable, and flourishing state.


Discussant: Alejandro Bárcenas, Texas State University
Speaker Link
Discussant: Yutang Jin, Princeton University
Speaker Link
Discussant: Mercedes Valmisa, Gettysburg College
Speaker Link
03/25/2022 Online Meeting
6:30 PM
Li Zehou on the 'Deep Structures of Confucianism'
Andrew Lambert, College of Staten Island, CUNY
Abstract

Abstract

Contemporary Chinese intellectual Li Zehou's cross-cultural methodology blends traditional Confucian thought with thinkers such as Kant and Marx. This seminar addresses the question of culture and its role in Li’s thought. Li has made several claims about how a settled cultural tradition influences the subjects within it. One such claim concerns the existence of ‘deep structures’ of Confucianism, as outlined in this preparatory reading. The idea is that culture, history, and social practice (collectively, a tradition) shape human psychology (including the formation of concepts, emotions, and values) in ways not always apparent to the subject. Within the Chinese tradition, Confucianism constitutes such a deep structure, and its effects cannot be captured by textual studies alone, nor studies of material culture. Rather, the deep structure is articulated in terms of an emergent shared subjectivity. Such traditions can evolve and ultimately dissolve; nevertheless, their effects are deep-rooted. This seminar meeting will aim to identify the parameters of Li’s ambitious theoretical framework and its plausibility, and to explore connections with current work in related fields, such as cultural and empirical psychology.


Discussant: Robert A. Carleo III, East China Normal University

Discussant: Emma Buchtel, Hong Kong Education University


05/13/2022 Faculty House, Columbia University
5:30 PM
A Case against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology
Allison Aitken, Columbia University
Abstract

Abstract

There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Śrīgupta (seventh-eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an ungrounded illusion. In this talk, I will present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s “neither-one-nor-many argument” against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.


Discussant: Alexander Englert, Princeton University